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Abstract: 
 
The construction of national identities through political discourse is a growing field of 
interest to social psychologists, particularly as many countries face changing 
demographics, borders and social realities as part of globalization, immigration and 
continued political cooperation and conflict. Through an analysis of 18 key speeches by 
Serbian politicians over the past 25 years, the present paper explores the question of how 
politicians, as entrepreneurs of identity, discursively manage the relationship between 
identity continuity and political change over time, in attempts to construct the future of a 
nation. Serbia, due to its recent history of socio-political turmoil and changing political 
landscape, offers an ideal context in which to explore the ways in which continuity is 
managed in times of change, and the consequences such discourses of continuity have on 
the construction of national identities. We conclude by discussing the implications that 
these discourses have for the future of Serbia, particularly as it works towards becoming 
the newest member-state of the European Union.  
 
Keywords: Serbia, national identity, political discourse, EU, history, socio-political 
change.   
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For more than two decades, Serbia has been a nation in turmoil and unease. From the fall 
of one superordinate union (Yugoslavia) to the continued efforts of joining another (the 
European Union), the Serbian political landscape has transitioned from authoritarian to 
pro-democratic. However, this transition from ex-Yugoslav to potential EU nation has 
not been without its complications. Both within Serbia as well as among EU member-
states, the integration process has been met with skepticism and resistance (Lašas, 2013; 
Obradovic-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012). In order to understand the national, as well as 
inter-national ambiguity towards Serbia’s potential membership in the EU, one must 
examine the history and politics of identity that have led up to present-day socio-political 
debates and tensions.  
 
The present paper draws on a diachronic dataset of selected political speeches from 
Serbia to illustrate how discourses on national identity, particularly in nations that have 
endured longer periods of political turmoil and change, become embedded in, and also 
constrained by, wider discourses on identity continuity developed over time.  
 
 
Serbia over the past 25 years 
Between the years 1991-1999, four wars were fought on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia, a supra-national state of six republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo 
and Vojvodina). The wars, including the aftermath of the conflicts, saw the revival of the 
importance of ethnic and national identities. The wars also saw the increased involvement 
of the international community in the region, particularly through the establishment of an 
International Crime Tribunal in Hague (ICTY) in 1993, intended to prosecute and convict 
war criminals from Former Yugoslavia, and the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to bomb Serbia in 1999. In Serbia, the context of this research, the 
involvement of the international community was frequently perceived as negative, unjust 
and unfair towards the nation and its people (Clark, 2008; Klarin, 2009; Obradovic, 
2016). This perception of Serbia as being ‘vilified’ on a global level lead to both 
institutional and political narratives emphasizing a stigmatized and victimized national 
identity during the 1990s (David, 2014; Subotić, 2011).   
 
Despite the difficult aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, the early 2000s were a time of re-
invention and democratic transition in Serbia. Beginning with the Democratic Revolution 
on October 5th, 2000, Serbian democratic parties gained rising support among the public. 
However, there was also resistance to this change, evident in the assassination attempt 
and subsequent killing of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić, an advocate of pro-democratic 
reforms. The year 2004 saw a win for democracy in Serbia when the president of the 
Democratic Party, Boris Tadić, was elected President for two consecutive terms (2004-
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2012). Alongside democratic and pro-European developments in Serbia, were worsening 
relations with Kosovo, an autonomous province in southern Serbia. The importance of 
the autonomous province lay in its historical, symbolic and religious significance in 
shaping the history of Serbia, but also its supposed destiny.  
 
In 1346, the Serbian Orthodox Church was founded on the territory of today’s Kosovo. In 
1389, a battle was fought between Serbs and Ottoman forces, which inevitable lead to a 
futile, but heroic loss for Serbia. Following the battle was a long period of Ottoman rule, 
during which the Patriarchate in Peć (located in today’s Kosovo) became the ‘capital’ of 
the Serbian state (Perica, 2002). The myth of the Battle of Kosovo tells the story of a 
physical defeat of the Serbian army, but a spiritual victory for the Serbian people through 
the creation of a ‘Heavenly Serbia’ (Anzulovic, 1999).  The ties between religion, 
national identity and history were further solidified through the recognition of the date of 
the battle as an official national holiday known as St Vitus Day (Bieber, 2002). In 
addition to being a religious and national holiday, the Kosovo myth has become a 
prevalent symbol of patriotism and self-sacrifice, with references to Kosovo as ‘Serbian 
Jerusalem’ found in political and religious discourses over the past centuries (Perica, 
2002). The reproduction of the Kosovo myth through banal cultural practices such as 
song, imagery and commemoration has kept the historical event alive and active in the 
national memory and identity.  
 
In 2008, Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, an act that was domestically 
considered (and still is) illegal, while internationally it has been recognized (and so 
validated) by the majority of EU member-states, but also a majority of the members of 
the United Nations (UN). Whether exploring the role of Kosovo in particular or Serbian 
politics in general, one must consider the role that national identity plays in shaping what 
political actions become seen as possible, and legitimate. The bulk of the burden for 
managing this relationship falls on politicians.  
 
Entrepreneurs of Identity 
Whether promoting change or upholding the status quo, politicians are faced with the task 
of aligning their political goals with national identity in order to gain power and authority 
to shape collective action. To be able to do so successfully, they must act as 
entrepreneurs of identity. In other words, when politicians claim to be speaking ‘on 
behalf of the nation’ when promoting a particular political agenda, they are engaging in 
an active process of constructing both the group boundaries of the nation and its content, 
as well as positioning themselves as the prototypical member, and thus best 
representative, of the group’s values and goals (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). By aligning 
the in-group identity with their political interests, leaders can gain social power and 
necessary political support to shape the future of a nation. 
 5 
In other words, while change inevitably occurs in all societies, it is those who propose 
change that face the task of making it appear natural and continuous with a group’s 
identity. Frequently, politicians do this by drawing on history, a powerful source of 
authority that can lend legitimacy to present political agendas. 
 
History plays an important part in shaping the nation and nationhood, and so becomes 
integral to national identity. According to Liu and Hilton (2005, p. 537), 
“[r]epresentations of history help to define the social identity of peoples, especially in 
how they relate to other people and to current issues of international politics and internal 
diversity.” An important concept to consider in relation to entrepreneurs of identity is the 
in-groups ‘historical charter’ (Liu & Hilton, 2005). A group’s charter binds the past, 
present and future of a nation by defining the historical origins and mission of the group. 
Often such charters can be traced back many centuries.  
 
Entrepreneurs of identity are thus not completely free to construct the content of a group 
identity but become constrained by these historical discourses that have developed over 
time, and have been afforded legitimacy and significance within the in-group context. 
The challenge for politicians, as key entrepreneurs of identity, is therefore twofold; to re-
negotiate historically established narratives to fit the needs of the present while also 
constructing their politics as the best possible way to maintain, and thus protect, the 
continuity of the nation and its identity.  
 
National Identity and Continuity 
As research on group identities has shown, people tend to perceive their in-groups as 
temporally continuous and enduring communities (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Sani et al., 
2007). Sani and colleagues (2007) have used the concept of ‘perceived collective 
continuity’ to discuss this phenomenon. Perceived collective continuity refers to the ways 
in which individuals feel as if their groups move over space and time in a coherent 
historical narrative that transmits and fosters essential group values, beliefs and 
traditions. There are two important dimensions that influence perceptions of in-group 
continuity, 1) perceived cultural continuity, and 2) perceived historical continuity. 
Perceived cultural continuity refers to the transmission (and continuation) of core cultural 
traits (values, traditions etc.) of the group over time, while perceived historical continuity 
is related to the ways in which events and periods of a group’s history become 
interconnected to create a coherent narrative. Experimental research using Sani’s work 
has shown that perceived cultural continuity, but not perceived historical continuity, can 
become important for increasing, or strengthening, group identification as it more 
strongly provides the individual’s need for self-continuity (Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2014). 
Thus, core cultural traits, which can become essential components of a group’s identity, 
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become more important to maintain and emphasize in order for individuals to feel a sense 
of continuity, both individually and collectively.  
 
A growing body of literature on group mergers and schisms illustrates the implications 
perceived collective continuity has for both the present, and future or groups.  
Namely, both strands of research demonstrate the ways in which proposed change 
becomes endorsed when it is seen as representing a progression, rather than rupture, with 
a group’s past and sense of identity (Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Van Knippenberg, Van 
Knippenberg, Monden & De Lima, 2002). As Sani (2008; Sani & Reicher, 2000) has 
shown, schisms are not triggered by disagreement over the proposed change but rather 
the implications this change has for group identity. Sani concludes by arguing that “[t]he 
studies I have discussed demonstrate that although changes are a natural, inevitable 
aspect of groups, group members make an important distinction; there are changes that 
improve, strengthen, and reinforce group identity, which are welcome, and changes that 
deny, overthrow, and subvert group identity, which are feared and opposed. (2008, 
p.726). Thus, when proposed change is seen as causing a break from a group’s essence, it 
can lead to group divides. However, it is important to note that what is considered a 
group’s essence is not pre-given or fixed, but rather, up for debate.  
 
By taking a social identity theory approach (SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to national 
identity, coupled with an emphasis on perceived collective continuity, we acknowledged 
the flexible and constructed nature of social categories over time. Social identities are 
thus processes, embedded within the larger social, cultural and political context of the 
present, but also of the past (Andreouli & Howarth, 2013). As Giving centrality to the 
past in relation to identity does not entail a loss of agency on the part of individuals, nor 
does it make history and tradition deterministic in limiting the possibility for social 
change. Rather, it is precisely through this theoretical framework that we are able to 
understand group identities, histories and futures not as pre-given or fixed, but as up for 
debate, contestation and re-negotiation over time and space (Howarth, 2011). 
 
As part of a larger research project looking at both the public and political side of 
Serbia’s recent history, politics and its impact on national identity (can you reference a 
paper here? Like a conferences paper, that discusses the PhD research as a whole? A 
reference here would be good – but say ‘author reference’), the present paper focuses 
exclusively on the latter. More specifically, it builds on existing literature exploring how 
political leaders mobilize identity in order to create support or resistance for political 
agendas, such as those of superordinate membership (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Klein & 
Licata, 2003; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; Sindic & Reicher, 2009). We extend this 
discussion by showing the benefits of using a diachronic data set to explore how 
discourses on change in the present become embedded and shaped by socio-political 
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changes of the past, affording change legitimacy and a sense of continuity. In this 
context, Serbia offers an ideal case study for exploring the ways in which national 
identities, but also national politics and futures, are co-constructed by the past, present 
and future.  
 
In what follows, we demonstrate this through a critical discourse analysis of political 
speeches in the Serbian context, offering a starting-point for exploring how present-day 
politics (regarding Serbia-EU relations) have become embedded and constrained by 
domestic politics and discourses on national identity over the past 20 years.  
 
Method 
Data  
Due to the centrality of continuity and change over time in this research project it was 
crucial to collect speeches over a significant time frame to explore the ways in which 
national identity has been constructed in historical turning points, and the implications this 
has for the politics, and future, of the nation. A survey was constructed asking participants 
in Serbia to rank 10 events from 1989-2000 and 10 events from 2001-2014 in order of their 
political significance. This was done to gain a general understanding of how Serbia national 
identity has been constructed by politicians in historic moments of significance for the 
public. The initial 20 events were chosen after consultation with a historian, political 
scientist and lawyer on Serbia’s recent history while the first author visited Belgrade in 
February, 2015, as well as an examination of the literature on Serbia’s recent political past 
(Damjanov, 2004; Ramet & Pavlaković, 2005; Živković, 2011).  
 
The rationale behind splitting up the time frame was to get an even distribution of speeches 
over the past 25 years. The survey (N=467) was administered through social media 
channels, probably limiting the generalizability of the results, although no demographic 
details were asked of participants so this is unclear. Nevertheless, the events that scored 
the highest in terms of significance seem to concur with the general literature on Serbia’s 
political history (Damjanov, 2004; Ramet & Pavlaković, 2005; Živković, 2011) as well as 
political events brought up in a previous study exploring collective memory in Serbia 
(Obradović, 2016). From the survey, the five highest ranked events of each time frame 
were chosen to inform the corpus for speech collection. The figure below illustrates the 
results of the survey as represented in a historical timeline.  
 
Figure 1: Historical Timeline of Political Events 
 
****[Insert Figure 1 around here]**** 
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Two speeches were chosen from each event. The selection of speeches focused on what 
we call ‘oppositional sampling’ where one speech was chosen to reflect the party in power 
and another to reflect the main opposition. Two additional criteria for the selection process 
included choosing speeches that addressed the domestic audience (i.e., public address, 
inauguration speech, general election address) and speeches that took place on, or close to 
the original event from the survey. Speeches were sampled from political elites, by which 
we mean individual politicians who played a central role in shaping Serbian politics at the 
time of a specific event. Due to the troubled past in Serbia, there are no official archives of 
speeches from recent history, instead, speeches were located through books, internet 
archives and political party websites. Because of this, the sample is not exhaustive. 
However as the goal of the project is to offer an in-depth exploration into how national 
identity is constructed at key political moments, with a particular focus on the importance 
of managing continuity and change, it makes no direct claims about the generalizability of 
these themes. Instead, the present study offers a starting-point for exploring national 
identity in Serbia as it has developed over time, as most studies have tended to focus on 
the construction of national identity in a specific time and context, without exploring the 
roots of these constructions or their further significance in the future. In addition, for some 
events (total of 3), due to the lack of access to speeches, it proved hard to find complete 
speeches to analyse, particularly in attempting to find speeches that reflected the party in 
power/opposition. In these specific cases, only one speech was used as it was considered 
important to have the whole speech, rather than selected parts of it, to be able to analyse 
the discourse in its entirety.  
 
Table 1 below describes the sample of speeches, including the name, political affiliation 
and position of speaker, as well as the particular domestic context of the speech.  
 
Table 1: Political Speeches 
 
****[Insert Table 1 around here]**** 
 
Analytic Procedure 
Taking a functional approach to language in context, the present paper draws on Critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) and more particularly on the Discourse-historical approach 
(DHA) developed by Wodak (1996; Wodak & Meyer, 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & 
Leibhart, 2009), to explore the ways in which talk is used to construct political change as 
aligned with identity and continuity. The DHA allows for an integration of the historical 
context in the analysis of naturally occurring language, thereby incorporating “a larger 
quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the 
social and political fields in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded” (Wodak, 2001, p. 
65). It further emphasizes the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between 
 9 
discourses and the history and situational frame of a speech or text. Intertextuality and 
interdiscursivity both refer to the ways in which texts or discourses are linked to, or 
embedded in, other larger discourses. This becomes particularly significant when exploring 
how discourses change in relation to socio-political change. Thus, we consider the DHA a 
suitable methodological tool for exploring the ways in which identity, continuity and 
political change are constructed and negotiated over time.  
 
A comprehensive guide to using the DHA can be found in Wodak et al.’s (2009) study of 
Austrian national identity. Within the book (pp.30-47), the authors distinguish between 
four closely interwoven dimensions of analysis which allow for triangulation; (1) 
identification of thematic content areas; (2) analysis of micro- and macro-level discourse 
strategies; (3) analysis of argumentation schemes, or topoi, as they relate to micro- and 
macro-level discourse strategies (i.e. topos of comparison; topos of threat); and (4) analysis 
of the linguistic means of realization of discourse strategies (i.e. the use of metaphor, 
rhetorical questions, referential vagueness) (pp. 30–47). Although both thematic content 
areas and the linguistic means of realization were explored in the analysis, in the interest 
of space and the emphasis on managing continuity and change within the corpus of 
speeches, the presentation of the results will focus mainly on discursive strategies and the 
accompanying argumentative schemes (topoi).  
 
Wodak et al., (2009) distinguish between five different discursive strategies (construction, 
perpetuation, justification, transformation and demontage/dismantling) frequently present 
in political speeches around nationhood. When exploring continuity and change, three 
strategies become particularly important; construction, perpetuation and justification. 
Strategies of construction attempt to establish a certain national identity by promoting 
unification within and differentiation from others, as well as identification and solidarity 
of the in-group. Strategies of perpetuation function to maintain and reproduce pre-existing 
groups or images, while strategies of justification serve a similar function while frequently 
drawing on the legitimacy of past acts “which have been put into question” in order to 
restore a positive image of the nation (Wodak et al., 2009, p.33). Relating to these strategies 
are various topoi, “warrants which guarantee the transition from argument to conclusion.” 
(Kienpointner, 2011, p.265). Another way to define topoi is as “those ‘search formulas’ 
that examine […] common knowledge, and compromise fallacious reasoning. (Boukala, 
2016, p. 252). As the analysis will show, the frequent use of topoi of threat and victimhood 
are drawn on by speakers to justify and perpetuate their political agendas as those that will 
defend and save the nation.   
 
The analysis is divided into two sections, each exploring a separate part of the 20-year time 
period. The first period (1992-2000) considers how democratic change emerged and gained 
strength in Serbia, cumulating in the overthrowing of Slobodan Milosevic’s authoritarian 
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government. The second period (2001-2012) explores how this progress towards 
democracy became embodied in the goal of EU integration, leading to tensions and divides 
within the democratic coalition as to how these changes would be realized, and their 
subsequent consequences for the nation and its future. Lastly we conclude with a discussion 
exploring to what extent discourses of change have become compatible with national 
identity, demonstrating that the latter time-period has shown less ability to coherently 
construct EU integration as the best possible future for Serbia due to its continued threats 
to historical and cultural continuity.  
 
 
1. 1992-2000: Change as Returning to Serbia’s True Self  
The first period explored in the analysis (1992-2000) was a time of war and conflict, 
bombing, corruption, propaganda and authoritarianism in Serbia. The emergence of a 
democratic voice was visible in the 1992 St Vitus Day Anti-Government Protest in 
Belgrade, where the Leader of the Democratic Renewal Movement gave a speech on St 
Vitus Day. Drawing on the momentum of the commemorative day, his speech paralleled 
the past with the present, giving the outlines of the ‘historical charter’ of Serbia.  
 
Ex 1:  
After 603 years, the St Vitus Day battle is being repeated. The first battle lasted one day, 
ours lasted 8 days. In the past battle around 1000 Serbs participated, in the present, a 
couple of million […] in the past one, no Serbs survived, in this one, no one was killed. 
Because of that, the past one was physically lost but morally and spiritually won. This one 
led to some type of defeat, as our goals were not reached. After that moral victory Serbs 
endured 500 years of Turkish slavery, after this St. Vitus Day, we cannot even endure 5 
years of communist slavery. (Vuk Drašković, 1992).  
 
Drawing a historical parallel, Vuk Drašković attempts to justify the purpose of the 
democratic opposition by likening the challenge faced by the opposition with that of 
Serbs in 1389. Much like Prince Lazar and the Serbian holy martyrs fought for the 
independence of their country, so 603 years later the democratic opposition is attempting 
to free Serbia from the tyranny of Slobodan Milosević. The historical charter thus sets out 
the mission of the group, to defend itself from allowing history, and the victimhood 
experienced by the people, to repeat itself. This topos of victimhood is further visualized 
through the sentence “he [Milosević] has locked Serbia into a cage. We are isolated from 
the rest of the world.” (Drašković, 1992). The anthropomorphic reference to Serbia as a 
caged prisoner emphasizes the asymmetric power relationship between Milosević and the 
people. Interesting enough, with the rise of the oppositional movement against Milosević, 
discourses around the emergence of a ‘Second Serbia’ followed (Mimica, 2002).  This is 
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visible in Drašković’s speech as well where he further parallels not just the past with the 
present, but the First Serbia with a Second. 
 
Ex 2: 
The whole of Europe and the world have seen who is who in Serbia, and this is the greatest 
victory of this St Vitus Day. Who relies on Kalashnikovs and whose full wit and power lays 
in Kalashnikovs, and who, in those same Kalashnikovs places carnations. These are two 
worlds, two Serbias, and we are doing everything so that the Serbia of carnations becomes 
so great that the evil, and we can already say crazy Serbia, drops its weapons from its 
hands. (Drašković, 1992).  
 
The emergence of a Second Serbia speaks to the belief of a growing part of the nation 
that the First Serbia (of Milosević) was not representative of their construction of Serbian 
identity and belonging, and thus a schism emerged in the nation where an alternative 
discourse around national identity and Serbian character developed (Sani, 2008). This 
Second Serbia offered a democratic alternative for the future of Serbia, a “savior” from 
the threat imposed by Milosević’s regime and a Serbia aligned with the morality of the 
rest of the world.   
 
In contrast, Milosević and members of the ruling elite considered the crisis of the early 
1990s “largely the consequence of international interest and the policy pursued in 
keeping with those interests.” (Milosević, 1992).  Through strategies of shifting blame, 
Milosević and his government place responsibility for Serbia’s current socio-political 
climate onto the international community. In turn, Milosević offers himself as the most 
competent politician to protect Serbia from outside threats. Thus, common in both the 
oppositional and ruling parties is an emphasis on victimhood and threat, however the 
difference lies in whether this threat is localized.   
 
The topoi of victimhood is frequently coupled with perseverance and resilience, a 
seemingly contradictory strategy rooted in the myth of Kosovo and its emphasis on the 
heroic martyrdom of the Serbian Prince Lazar. Thus, within most political speeches 
during the first time-period, a common argumentative structure is visible. Namely, after 
first establishing the nation as a victim (of either other politicians or an external threat), 
the speakers justify and/or perpetuate their politics as representing a sense of 
empowerment and redemption for the people. Consider Zoran Djindjić’s speech in 1995, 
the year the war in Bosnia finally came to an end;  
 
Ex 3: 
Our generation is a generation that has a huge responsibility. Of course, with this 
responsibility comes great honor. We are chosen. We have a mission. That mission will 
 12 
not bring us any honor, nor will it bring us prosperity, because the time of our generation 
is a time of asceticism and renunciation. Only those who are willing to give up their 
personal well-being, can say, ‘we belong to that generation in Serbia that saved Serbia, 
we are the people of the new politics’. (Djindjić, 1995).  
 
Zoran Djindjić draws on the topoi of heroic martyrdom to construct the Democratic 
opposition as the selfless saviors of Serbia. By aligning the political goal of the party with 
the characteristics of national identity, the proposed change put forward by the 
Democratic opposition is seen not as an alternative, but as a civic and moral 
responsibility. Djindjic’s discourse does not emphasize the need for transformation, 
thereby risking the possibility that his politics will be seen as a break from the past, but 
rather perpetuates his politics as the necessary path to ensure that Serbia will endure as a 
nation in the future.. As Wodak et al., (2009) note, the topoi of threat is frequently used 
within strategies of perpetuation to position the speaker in defense of the nation. In this 
sense, the Democratic Party’s Serbia comes to actually represent the true Serbia. 
This becomes more clearly articulated in 1998, when Djindjić argues that democratic 
change “means that things again come back to their rightful place.”  
 
In contrast, Milosević see not himself, but the external world outside of Serbia, as its 
biggest threat to continuity. In 1999, at the start of the NATO bombing, Milosević made a 
public announcement, stating that; 
 
Ex 4: 
They [NATO] have chosen that door [Kosovo] because it is assumed that an Albanian 
Separatist Movement should stand in front of it, and not the army of Yugoslavia, and not 
the citizens of this country as a whole. And in that way, our country, step-by-step, but very 
quickly, will lose its independence and its freedom. The only right decision that could have 
been made was to refuse the acceptance of foreign troops on our territory. (Milosević, 
1999).  
 
Similarly to the Democratic speakers, Milosević draws on the topos of threat to construct 
his politics as the most appropriate ones in the context. However, unlike the Democratic 
speakers, the source of threat is not internal, but external. Another similarity between the 
different speakers is the strategic use of Kosovo to construct continuity as compatible with 
the politics of the speakers. The use of Kosovo in arguments is the most visible in speeches 
occurring in 2000, the year where the struggle for democratic change in Serbia finally 
became realized in the 5th October Revolution. The event led to the overthrow of Milosević 
and the beginning of democracy under the leadership of Vojislav Koštunica, Leader of the 
Democratic Party of Serbia. The extracts illustrate the ways in which political elites 
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discursively draw on us-them distinctions to position their political opponents as against 
the interests of the in-group. 
 
Extract 5:  
With the establishment of an administration supported or installed by NATO, Yugoslavia 
would quickly be dismembered. These are not NATO's intentions alone. These are the pre-
election promises of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. […] Within this policy of 
dismembering Yugoslavia, Kosovo would be the first victim. Its present status would be 
proclaimed legal and final. It is the first part of Serbian territory to which Serbia would 
have to bid farewell, without even a hope that we could reclaim this part of our country. 
(Milosević, 2000). 
 
Extract 6: 
If there is anyone who has led anti-Serbian politics, Albanian politics in recent years, if 
there is anyone who made it possible for the Albanians to come close to an independent 
Kosovo, if there is anyone who has brought so many foreign troops into Kosovo, into our 
country, that is Slobodan Milosević. […] And I know, that there would not have been NATO 
troops on either side of the Danube had there been no Slobodan Milosević.”(Koštunica, 
2000).  
 
In both speeches, the same discursive arguments are used to position the speaker as the 
voice of the in-group, and the opponent as a part of the out-group. Interesting enough, both 
speakers also draw on the issue of Kosovo, to construct the political opponent as working 
against Serbian interests. This is accomplished through parallels between their opponent 
and various others, either in explicit (NATO, Albanian) and more vague terms (anti-
Serbian, foreign troops). Thus while both politicians take for granted the importance of 
Kosovo for the nation, this ‘common sense’ knowledge is utilized to justify very different 
political agendas.  It is through these discourses that we also see that various international 
organizations and countries are not seen as collaborators or partners of Serbia, but as 
unwelcome intruders causing conflict and loss of territory in the country. The presence of 
an external threat was common in discourses of the ruling elite, but less prevalent in the 
democratic opposition.  
 
This first section illustrates the importance of playing on fear, and the strategic discursive 
work by the opposition to try to position their politics as not a break from the past, but 
rather a return to a more moral, and righteous Serbia, a Serbia that has to be saved from 
the hands of Slobodan Milosevic. Thus for the opposition, their work is the work of 
heroic martyrs, much like that of Prince Lazar in 1389, who have taken upon themselves 
the difficult task of freeing Serbia from its authoritarian oppressor. Meanwhile, 
Milosevic’s tactic plays on victimhood and threat as well, but on a larger, global scale. 
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By emphasizing the victimhood and unfairness against Serbia by the global community, 
he is able to position himself, and his politics, as those that will protect Serbia. Thus, his 
discourse focuses not on saving, but protecting Serbia. In turn, Milosevic is able to create 
a sense of isolation within the public, a sense of international stigma and rejection, which 
is evident in the public attitudes towards the ICTY (as discussed in the introduction; 
Karin, 2009). Further, as we will see in the next section, while the democratic opposition 
managed to take over political power in Serbia, a lingering sense of international stigma 
and unfairness cast shade on the project of EU integration, and made the pro-EU 
politicians face a harder task of promoting the compatibility between Serbia’s political 
and historical past, and its potential EU future.  
 
 
2. 2001-2012: Change as Democratization through EU Integration 
Following the democratic turn in Serbia in 2000, discussions about democratization and 
modernization slowly became synonyms with ‘Europeanization’ and the development of a 
‘European perspective’ in Serbia. Thus, while the first period showed discourses around 
change centering on how democracy was a way to re-gain freedom, in the second period, 
the democratic politicians developed this discourse further by arguing for the need to move 
from isolation and “reintegrate into the international community” (Micić, 2003). 
However, an awareness of the stigma attached to Serbia due to the recent past is visible in 
these discourses, where an emphasis on the “need to return into history” (Djindjić, 2003) 
and the “need to make up for lost times” (Tadić, 2004) constructs the past as a time of 
rupture from Serbia’s true trajectory as a nation. It is thus in this second period that we 
seem more explicitly the importance of establishing positive recognition for Serbia in the 
eyes of ‘others’, particularly the European community. This is visible in discussions of EU 
integration, as in Boris Tadić’s 2004 Presidential Inauguration Speech. 
 
Ex 7:  
… [T]here is a great energy to continue the improvement of Serbia and her inclusion into 
the EU. Serbia has had enough misunderstandings with the world and dissent in the 
country, and is ready to recognize a new character of politicians who will assume more 
responsibility, more effort and a different political voice. (Tadić, 2004).  
 
The use of the word ‘misunderstandings’ allows Tadić to scapegoat any responsibility for 
Serbia’s recent past and the antagonistic relations it created vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Instead, by positioning himself as part of a new wave of politicians, the political goal of 
EU integration becomes part of a new chapter of ‘Second Serbia’ rather than the old politics 
of the ‘First’ and corrupt Serbia.  
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Besides the emphasis on the 90s as a rupture from a Serbian continuity, another trend was 
visible in the second time-period. Namely, the second period saw a schism occur within 
the democratic coalition as a result of tensions over what this newly created democratic 
Serbia would actually look like. As the ruling elite argued for EU integration as 
democratization, this soon became challenged by an emerging democratic opposition. An 
important cause of tension during this period was the extent to which Serbia as a whole 
(including Kosovo) was compatible with a democratic future accumulating in EU 
membership. Thus again we see the continued significance of Kosovo in shaping the 
‘essence’ of the group, and the extent to which potential changes to its status in Serbia 
would lead to a rupture within the group (Sani, 2008).  
 
On February 17th, 2008, Kosovo declared unilateral independence. A few months later, the 
EU signed a Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, despite the fact 
that Serbia had not fulfilled all of the EU’s demands for signing the agreement. This led 
many in Serbia to consider the SAA a ‘concession’ to Serbia, to pressure it to recognize 
Kosovo (Subotić, 2010). The clashing of these two events in turn positioned EU integration 
as a threat to Kosovo and Serbian sovereignty. This discourse of incompatibility is perhaps 
best illustrated through the following extract from Vojislav Koštunica’s speech at the 
Protest ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ held in Belgrade in February, 2008, only days after the province 
declared independence.  
 
Extract 8: 
If we as Serbs renounce Serbianhood, our origin, our Kosovo, our ancestors and our 
history – then, who are we Serbs? What is our name then? Is there a nation in the world 
that is being asked to renounce everything that makes it a nation, as is being sought of 
the Serbs today? If we accept that we are not Serbs, they are promising us that we, as a 
nation without memory and origin, will be better off. They are asking us to give up our 
brothers on Kosovo. (Koštunica, 2008-1). 
 
It is through argumentative schemes drawing on family, identity and origin that Kosovo is 
constructed as the essence of Serbia, in turn to justify the rejection of the demands made 
by an unidentified ‘they’. Considering the wider context of this speech, we see that ‘they’ 
refers to the EU. Namely, as a consequence of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the 
Democratic coalition became divided on the issue of how to proceed with EU relations. 
The schism that occurred as a result of the event in turn speaks to the feared implications 
EU integration might have for Kosovo’s status within the group, an argument both sides 
drew on.  
 
Ex 9: 
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Our first objective must be to defend Serbia, which means to defend Kosovo. And when we 
would agree to only defend Kosovo literally, while using alternative routes by signing 
various agreements to gradually allow for the implementation of Kosovo’s independence, 
then without a doubt, that same foreign actor would assert that we are good and that we 
are committed to European integration. The DSS will never accept that pro-European 
means paying with 15% of Serbian territory. Nor will we ever accept that we are not for 
Europe simply because we are for all of Serbia in Europe. (Koštunica, 2008-2) 
 
Ex 10: 
 As was said yesterday in Luxemburg by European officials, the SAA is neutral on the 
question of the status of Kosovo, the solution to the question of the status of Kosovo and 
Metohija will be found in the UN Security Council and in direct contact with those 
countries who unfortunately made the mistake and injustice towards our country by 
recognizing the illegal unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo. And the address 
is not Brussels, it’s not Luxemburg, but Washington, Rome, Paris and London. And of 
course New York where the UN is located. Those are the addresses for solving the problem 
of Kosovo, and not the SAA or Brussels and Luxemburg. […] So any other representations 
of this reality is clear political manipulation and lie as part of pre-election campaigning. 
(Đelić, 2008-2).  
 
The importance of constructing change as continuous with politics around Kosovo is 
visible in both speeches, and it is again here that we see the international community in 
general, and the EU in particular as being constructed as a possible threat by the opposition, 
against which Serbia is allowed, and should, defend itself. While both politicians 
acknowledge the incompatibility between Serbia’s politics towards Kosovo and the politics 
of the member-states of the EU, Kostunica does so by clearly articulating that Serbia will 
only be accepted and ‘good’ to the extent that it gives up some of its territory. In contrast, 
Delic, trying to appease these criticisms and an increasingly worrying public, refers to these 
incompatibilities as a unfortunate mistake made by the countries that recognized Kosovo’s 
decision as a just and legal one. Delic further chooses to repudiate the potential threat of 
losing Kosovo as part of joining the EU by spacially separating the political issues. The 
issue of Kosovo (Washington, Rome, Paris and London) and the EU integration process 
(Brussels, Luxemburg) are thus geographically located in different places. In doing so, 
Delic is able to reject fears of loss of uniqueness (through loss of Kosovo) as a consequence 
of another set of political actions (EU integration) (Wodak et al., 2009). In other words, he 
is able to consolidating continuity and change by physically and psychologically separating 
the two political agendas. 
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A similar attempt at appeasing fears of loss of continuity due to EU integration can be seen 
in the following extract by President Boris Tadic in 2012, the year when Serbia gained 
official candidacy status. 
 
Ex 11:  
The position of Serbia is crystal clear in terms of the recognition of Kosovo. Serbia is not 
going to recognize Kosovo’s independence under any circumstances and that is all that I 
can say today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. That position is not changeable. 
(Tadić, 2012).  
 
Within this second time-period we see attempts by politicians to try to anchor the process 
of democratization in the idea of joining the European Union. While the democratic 
coalition was successful in promoting democracy in the first time-period, the second time-
period led to a schism within the democratic coalition due to the inability to consolidate 
EU integration with the domestic politics towards Kosovo. Thus we see the increasing 
challenges faced by politicians trying to promote EU integration as the incompatibility 
between domestic and foreign policies is causing ambiguity towards the process, both 
within the nation but also within the larger context of EU member-states (Lašas, 2013; 
Obradovic-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012).  
 
Discussion 
The present analysis illustrated the ways in which politicians navigate arguments of 
continuity and change over time by drawing on various strategies of construction, 
justification and perpetuation. The use of an extended time-frame allowed us to illustrate 
how discourses on political change become localized in larger discourses on history, 
continuity with history and national identity. In turn, it further allowed us to illustrate how 
the territory of Kosovo, rooted in the myth of origin, has permeated discussion of change 
over the last 20 years in Serbia, and is frequently drawn on as a strategic resource by 
politicians to positions their politics as aligned with national interests and identity. Lastly, 
the analysis demonstrated the ways in which not only history, but also more powerful 
‘other’ players, such as the international community, are draw on to ‘legitimize’ political 
agendas or to construct the nation as under threat. We will discuss each in turn before 
concluding.  
 
The analysis illustrated that while no explicit references to ‘national identity’ were present 
(only one instance of this occurred within the 18 speeches), the construction of an in-group 
identity occurred through references to history, to continuity and to the importance of unity 
against a potential threat. The speeches chosen focused on significant political events in 
Serbia’s recent history, and they illustrate the challenge faced by politicians in attempting 
to act as entrepreneurs of identity in order to mobilize the public for collective action 
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(Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The analysis illustrates that these entrepreneurs of identity 
become restricted by the historical charter and thus have to make their political ideas 
compatible with the perceived historical origin and mission of the in-group. Most 
frequently we saw this occurring in relation to Kosovo.  
 
From the analysis it can be argued that the battle of Kosovo in 1389 has continued to be an 
important guiding historical charter within politics in Serbia over the past 20 years (Liu & 
Hilton, 2005). While the first time-period more explicitly established Kosovo as the heart 
of the nation, the second time-period shows a more taken-for-grantedness in regards to the 
symbolic significance of Kosovo, and instead emphasizes Serbia’s political stance towards 
the region. Thus embedded within the second time-period is a larger discourse established 
and legitimized in the first time-period, particularly through the voice of the democratic 
opposition. Further it is only in the context of politics directly effecting Kosovo that a group 
schism occurred in the second time-period, illustrating the importance of perceived 
collective continuity within the nation and its influence on political decision-making (Sani 
et al., 2007).  
 
Lastly, the importance of the international community is similar over the data-set, for those 
proposing change it is seen as an ally, whereas for those resisting change, it is seen as a 
threat. Thus, those proposing political change, which at times is seen as incompatible with 
continuity, choose to also draw on the support and authority of the international community 
to support their goals. The importance of international recognition of Serbia becomes 
evident in second time-period as the politicians attempt to overcome the stigmatizing 
consequences of the 1990s and re-establish a positive image of Serbia. This has not only 
consequences for politics, but also national identity and the political attitudes of the people. 
Powerful ‘others’ become resources for politicians to draw on in order to afford legitimacy 
to their politics and to thereby attempt to construct a sense of belonging, and 
representativeness, within the larger international community in general and the 
superordinate group of the EU in particular. Appeasing threats to autonomy and identity 
when joining a superordinate group becomes important in creating public support for the 
union (Sindic & Reicher, 2008; Wodak et al., 2009).  
 
In the present study, the inclusion of a temporal dimension allowed us to  examine how the 
co-existence of continuity and change occurred in political discourse. We illustrated how 
a longitudinal approach to social-political phenomena such as identity allows us to clearly 
track how change becomes constructed as non-threatening to a nation and its way of life 
by making promises of continuity to historical and cultural elements of a national identity. 
Thus, the present study offers some insight into the ways in which political elites mobilize 
identity in order to promote political agendas, in different ways over time. It extends this 
discussion by showing that entrepreneurs of identity strategically embed discourses on 
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change within established and non-threatening discourses. Namely, discourses on EU 
integration become embedded in discourses on democratization which emphasize freedom, 
integration and modernization. Thus, a psychological perspective with a temporal 
dimension can function to track how the political agendas proposed by politicians move 
from ‘being’ possible alternatives for the future to ‘becoming’ socially recognized and 
acceptable avenues of progress.   
 
As the present study focused on a larger time-frame for exploring representations of history 
and identity in relation to EU integration in Serbia, it is limited in its ability to cover recent 
developments in the process. Indeed, as the speeches were chosen based on a survey, it 
restricted the freedom to select discourses taking place around EU specific topics. 
Therefore we suggest that future research look at more recent developments in the EU 
integration process in Serbia, exploring perhaps how different political parties construct 
discourses around membership and identity differently or how the EU itself has responded 
to and treated the Serbian integration process.  
 
Despite these limitations, analyzing political discourse from a social psychological 
perspective is beneficial as it provides an example of how naturalistic data can be utilized 
to explore complex socio-political issues such as the interplay of identity, history and 
political change in a country’s transition into superordinate membership. Furthermore, it 
emphasizes the importance of how context interacts with social actors in order to promote 
or resist change and how political discourse is intertextual, frequently embedded in larger 
discourses to become familiar and legitimate.  
 
Conclusion 
Power, be it social or political, is legitimized or de-legitimized in discourses. One of the 
ways in which this occurs is by constructing one’s politics as aligned with history, and thus 
a continuation of a group’s essence. Politicians then, as key entrepreneurs of identity, can 
attempt to discursively manage the relationship between identity continuity and political 
change by perpetuating a national identity rooted in a historically developed (and so taken-
for-granted) discourses on the origin and mission of the nation. These historical charters 
become powerful tools for shaping collective action and the future of a nation.  
 
In the present paper we have shown the ways in which this occurs, and by using an extended 
time-frame, the diachronic nature of discourse on socio-political change in Serbia has been 
demonstrated. Although the study does not offer an exhaustive account of political 
discourse in Serbia over the past 25 years, it does offer a starting-point for exploring how 
discourses on political change become embedded in larger discourses on history, identity 
and continuity and thus become legitimized or rejected.  
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The implications of changing discourses is that it shapes what possible futures can be 
envisioned by limiting which political actions are acceptable and which are not. The 
presence of group divides, or schisms, in both time-periods speaks to the importance of 
aligning the past, present and future of a group in a coherent narrative. The implications of 
this for the study of socio-political change is that it allows us to understand how history 
and powerful others become psychologically utilized in processes of national agenda 
setting. Specifically, by looking at the role political speeches play in this process, we can 
understand how the democratic choices that citizens make about their nation’s future are 
informed by the available discourses within their socio-political environment. In doing so, 
we see the importance of considering the role of time in research on socio-political change.  
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1 The Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia are two different political parties.  
Event  Speaker Political Position / Affiliation Political  
Ideology 
Speech Context 
1992 Vuk 
Drašković 
 
Leader of the Serbian Renewal 
Movement. 
 Centre-
right wing 
St Vitus Day Assembly, 
Anti-Government protest 
rally,  
June 28th, 1992 
1992 Slobodan 
Milosević 
President of Serbia, Leader of 
the Socialist Party of Serbia. 
Centre-left, 
Left-wing 
2nd SPS Congress, Closing 
Statement 
October 23rd, 1992 
1995 Zoran 
Djindjić 
 
President of the Democratic 
Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-left 
wing 
 ‘5 Years of the Democratic 
Party’ Assembly,  
3rd March, 1995 
1995 Slobodan 
Milosević 
President of Serbia, Leader of 
the Socialist Party of Serbia. 
Centre-left, 
Left-wing 
Televised announcement 
following signing of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement,  
28th December, 1995 
1998 Mirko 
Marjanović 
 
Prime Minister of Serbia, 
Member of the Socialist Party 
of Serbia. 
Centre-left, 
left wing 
Parliamentary address after 
Kosovo war started,  
24th March, 1998 
1998 Zoran 
Djindjić  
President of the Democratic 
Party.  
Centre, 
Centre-left 
wing 
Democratic Party Assembly, 
17th July, 1998 
1999 
Vojislav 
Koštunica  
 
Leader of the Democratic Party 
of Serbia.1 
Right-wing Public announcement at 
beginning of NATO 
bombing,  
 25 
24th March, 1999 
1999 
Slobodan 
Milosević 
President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Leader of the Socialist Party of 
Serbia. 
Centre-left, 
Left wing 
Address to the nation at 
beginning of NATO 
bombing,  
24th March, 1999 
20000 
Slobodan 
Milosević 
President of Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia until the 7th of 
October, Leader of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia. 
Centre-left, 
Left wing 
Public televised address to 
the nation before elections 
(which he lost), 
2nd October, 2000 
2000 
Vojislav 
Koštunica  
 
President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia after 
7th October, Democratic Party 
of Serbia. 
Right-wing Address at meeting after 
(won) election, 
5th October, 2000 
2003 Zoran 
Djindjić 
 
Prime Minister of Serbia until 
death in 2003, Leader of the 
Democratic Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-left 
wing 
13th anniversary of the 
Democratic Party, 
1st February, 2003 
2003 Natasa Micić  Acting President of Serbia, 
Member of the Civil Alliance 
of Serbia. 
Centre  Public address after Zoran 
Djindjić’s assassination, 
declaring state of emergency 
in Serbia, 
12th March, 2003 
2004 Boris Tadić President of Serbia, Newly 
elected Leader of the 
Democratic Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-left 
wing 
Televised inauguration 
ceremony,  
11th July, 2004 
2008 
(1) 
 
1. Vojislav 
Koštunica 
 
Prime Minister of Serbia, 
Democratic Party of Serbia. 
Right-wing Protest ‘Kosovo is Serbia’,  
21st February, 2008 
2008 
(2) 
Bozidar Đelić  
 
Deputy Prime Minister of 
Serbia, Member of the 
Democratic Party. 
Centre, 
Centre-left 
wing 
Press Conference following 
SAA signing, 
30th April, 2008 
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2008 
(2) 
Vojislav 
Koštunica 
Prime Minister of Serbia, 
Democratic Party of Serbia. 
Right-wing General Election assembly,  
26th June, 2008 
2012 1. Boris Tadić President of Serbia, Leader of 
the Democratic Party,  
Centre, 
Centre-left 
wing 
Press Conference following 
EU granting Serbia official 
candidate status,  
2nd March, 2012 
